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YIELDING TO THE TEMPTATION TO OPEN PANDORA’S BOX: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CREATES A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
AND DECLARES RING v. ARIZONA RETROACTIVE 
IN SUMMERLIN v. STEWART 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past three years, the criminal justice process has undergone 
significant changes concerning the respective roles of the judge and the jury.  
In June 2000, the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey decided that the 
jury — rather than the judge — must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact 
which increases a defendant’s punishment beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum.1  The Court based its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.2 
The legal effect of Apprendi was unprecedented.  One impact of the 
doctrine fell upon the shoulders of federal prosecutors, as it affected their 
strategies in narcotics prosecutions.  Prior to Apprendi, the judge determined 
aggravating factors such as the amount or type of drug in the defendant’s 
possession.3  However, after Apprendi, prosecutors were faced with the 
constitutionality of the process because under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, factors such as the amount or type of narcotics can potentially boost 
a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum.4  Thus, Apprendi raised 
 
 1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000).  The specific issue in Apprendi 
was New Jersey’s hate crime statute, which provided for an extended term of imprisonment if a 
defendant committed an offense “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of 
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”  Id. 
at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-3(e) (2000)).  The determination that Apprendi’s 
actions were “motivated by racial bias” and made “with a purpose to intimidate,” and thus fit 
within the meaning of the statute, was made by the trial judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and Apprendi’s sentence on one count was raised from the ten year statutory maximum 
to twelve years.  Id. at 471, 474.  Apprendi challenged the constitutionality of his sentence, 
arguing that the hate-crime aggravator should have been found by the jury and beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 471.  The Supreme Court agreed and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490. 
 2. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77. 
 3. See Meleah Burch, Note: False Hope for Prisoners: The Dangers of Making Apprendi v. 
New Jersey Retroactively Applicable to Felony Drug Convictions, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L.REV. 49, 
57 (2001). 
 4. Id. at 55-59. 
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the issue of whether the jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt factors 
such as the type and amount of illegal substance the defendant had in his 
possession or had the intent to distribute.5 
Other legal questions were posed by Apprendi: Is the Apprendi doctrine 
applicable to sentences that are increased within the statutory range?  Should 
the enhancing factor be charged in the indictment?  Should the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Apprendi be applied retroactively?6  One question springing 
from Apprendi quickly worked its way to the Supreme Court: How does 
Apprendi affect state statutes which permit judges to find aggravating 
circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty?  That issue was 
presented in Ring v. Arizona.7 
Just two years after its decision in Apprendi, the Supreme Court granted a 
writ of certiorari to Timothy Ring, who had been convicted of first-degree 
felony murder by a jury and sentenced to death in a separate proceeding by the 
presiding judge.8  At the time, Arizona’s sentencing statute required the 
presiding judge in a murder trial to determine, outside the presence of the jury 
and after the jury’s decision on guilt of first-degree murder, the existence of 
aggravating circumstances and the absence of mitigating circumstances as 
required for imposition of the death penalty.9 
Ring argued that the Arizona statute infringed upon his Sixth Amendment 
rights under Apprendi.10  Specifically, because the Arizona statute required a 
finding of at least one aggravating factor in order to impose the death penalty, 
the maximum punishment to which Ring could have been sentenced, based 
upon the jury verdict alone, would have been life imprisonment.11  The 
Supreme Court agreed with this argument in Ring and held that “[b]ecause 
Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent 
of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be 
found by a jury.”12 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ring proved to be no less significant than 
Apprendi — and presented no fewer perplexing legal questions to the eight 
states that, at the time of the decision, allowed judicial determination of the 
 
 5. See id. 
 6. Heather Jones, Apprendi v. New Jersey: A True “Watershed” Ruling, 81 TEX L. REV. 
1361, 1364 (2003). 
 7. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89, 596 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 591, 594. 
 9. “At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to determine the presence or 
absence of the enumerated ‘aggravating circumstances’ and any ‘mitigating circumstances.’  The 
State’s law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at least one 
aggravating circumstance and ‘there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to 
call for leniency.’”  Id. at 592-93 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (2004)). 
 10. Ring, 536 U.S. at 595. 
 11. Id. at 597. 
 12. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494). 
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death penalty.13  The plethora of questions came partly as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s ambiguity in its decision in Ring.14  For example, states with 
“hybrid” death penalty systems, in which the judge determines the imposition 
of the death penalty after hearing the recommendation of the jury on the 
sentence, began questioning the constitutionality of the process.15  The effect 
of the Ring decision has been serious — some states with hybrid systems have 
redrafted statutes, and some have even stayed executions.16 
Although many important legal questions were posed by the holding in 
Ring, possibly the most important is an issue that has the potential to affect the 
integrity of our judicial system, the families of victims murdered by prisoners 
on death row, and the fate of hundreds of inmates who have been convicted 
under unconstitutional state statutes.17  The question of concern is whether the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona may be retroactively applied to 
convictions that had already become “final” at the time that the Supreme Court 
announced the rule in Ring.18 
Considering the grave implications surrounding the issue, it is not 
surprising that many state and federal courts alike have confronted the question 
 
 13. See Casey Laffey, The Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment: How Will the System 
Look After Ring v. Arizona?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 371, 383 (2003); Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court Roundup; Justices to Revisit Judges’ Role in Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2003, at A19 (discussing Supreme Court’s recent decision to review Blakely v. Washington, 124 
S. Ct. 429 (2003), which poses the issue of the Ring decision in the context of state sentencing 
guidelines). 
 14. See Laffey, supra note 13, at 382.  “Several commentators have criticized the decision 
for not giving other state courts and legislatures a clear rule or guide to determine whether their 
death penalty systems are constitutional.”  Id. 
 15. Id. at 385. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 391.  “The application of Ring to past and future death sentences will be 
important because most, if not all, convicted defendants will bring direct appeals or habeas corpus 
petitions in hope that the holding in Ring will save their lives.”  Laffey, supra note 13, at 391. 
 18. The definition of “final,” used by the Supreme Court in several cases addressing the 
issue, is the time at which “the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal 
exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed.”  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 622 n.5 (1965).  Since 1982, issues of retroactivity have involved the application of new 
rules to cases on collateral review, as cases on direct appeal were automatically given retroactive 
effect after United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562-63 (1982).  A petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus is one form of collateral review.  The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to 
“attack the legality of a petitioner’s confinement.”  Julie B. Richardson-Stewart, One Full Bite at 
the Apple: Defining Competent Counsel in Texas Capital Post-Conviction Review, 9 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 221, 224 (2003).  Federal habeas corpus, as opposed to state habeas corpus, 
is “the mechanism by which violations of a state inmate’s federal constitutional rights may be 
brought before a federal court.”  Jean K. Gilles Phillips and Elizabeth Cateforis, Federal Habeas 
Corpus for Trial Lawyers, 73 J. KAN. BAR. ASSN. 20, 21 (2004).  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 
(2004). 
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of the retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona.19  In September 2003, the issue 
provoked a split in the United States circuit courts of appeals when the Ninth 
Circuit in Summerlin v. Stewart held that Ring v. Arizona is subject to 
retroactive application.20  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit deviated from the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cannon v. Mullin and the Eleventh Circuit’s in 
Turner v. Crosby — both holding that Ring is not to be applied retroactively to 
cases on collateral review.21  The issue is one that can be resolved only by the 
United States Supreme Court.  In the meantime, this note will provide a history 
of the doctrine of retroactivity, an analysis of Summerlin v. Stewart and the 
circuit split, and the author’s analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in light of 
the history and reasoning of the Supreme Court on the issue. 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF RETROACTIVITY 
Legal discussion on the topic of retroactivity traces back to 1809 when 
Blackstone asserted that courts were not to “pronounce new law, but [were] to 
maintain and expound the old one.”22  Since that time, in the words of Justice 
Harlan, the Supreme Court has “created an extraordinary collection of rules to 
govern the application of [the] principle.”23  In his dissent in Desist v. United 
States, Justice Harlan observed that prior to Desist the Supreme Court had, “in 
so short a time, generated so many incompatible rules and inconsistent 
principles” addressing the topic of retroactivity.24  In his concurrence in 
Williams v. United States, Harlan stated that the Court’s doctrine of 
retroactivity had become “almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a 
beast of prey in search of its intended victim.”25  Currently the doctrine 
governing questions of retroactivity is that derived from Teague v. Lane26 and 
its progeny.  However, as this circuit split demonstrates, the rule of Teague has 
proved to be a confusing and difficult rule to apply.27 
 
 19. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Arizona 
Supreme Court decisions of State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2003) and State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 
915 (Ariz. 2003)). 
 20. Id. at 1121. 
 21. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 
989 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 22. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-23 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed. 
1809)). 
 23. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 258. 
 25. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 26. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 27. See generally Mark R. Barr, The Not-So-Great Writ: An Analysis of Recent Tenth Circuit 
Decisions Reflecting the Current Difficulty in Obtaining Habeas Corpus Relief for State 
Prisoners, 80 DEN. U. L. REV. 497 (2003). 
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A. Pre-Teague Retroactivity 
The common law doctrine of retroactivity was simple.  Due to the 
underlying idea that judges were not the “makers” of the law, but rather the 
individuals who discovered what the law had always been, any judgments 
inconsistent with a newly-announced “discovery” of law were quite simply 
“never the law.”28  In 1886, the United States Supreme Court adhered to this 
principle in Norton v. Shelby, holding that “unconstitutional action ‘confers no 
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in 
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.’”29 
In 1965, the Supreme Court decided Linkletter v. Walker, which addressed 
the issue of whether the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio should be applied 
to state court convictions that had already become final.30  In Mapp, the Court 
held that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was to be 
excluded in state criminal trials by way of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.31  The Linkletter Court was guided by three factors in 
its determination that Mapp was not to be applied retroactively: (1) the purpose 
of the new rule announced in Mapp, (2) the reliance on legal doctrine 
preceding the decision in Mapp, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of 
the rule on the administration of justice.32 
In applying the factors set out in Linkletter, the Court reasoned that the 
purpose of Mapp, which was to deter illegal police searches, “would not be 
advanced by making the rule retrospective.”33  Furthermore, both prosecutors 
and defendants had relied upon the pre-Mapp rule, articulated in Wolf v. 
Colorado, which did not require state exclusion of illegally-obtained 
evidence.34  Finally, the Linkletter Court asserted, “[t]o make the rule of Mapp 
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.”35  The 
Court explained that the process of rehearing cases tainted by the admission of 
evidence that should have been excluded would be next to impossible, 
considering the destruction of evidence and the unavailability of witnesses.36 
Shortly after Linkletter, Johnson v. New Jersey and Stovall v. Denno 
dispelled any idea that the test of Linkletter applied only to cases that had 
already become final at the time the new rule was decided or that cases 
 
 28. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-23. 
 29. Id. at 623 (quoting Norton v. Shelby, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)). 
 30. Id. at 622.  “By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the 
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio.”  Id. at 622 n.5. 
 31. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961). 
 32. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. 
 33. Id. at 637. 
 34. Id.  See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637. 
 36. Id. 
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pending on direct review should automatically be given retroactive effect.37  
Both cases asserted that the Linkletter factors should be applied properly not 
just to convictions already final but also to convictions pending on direct 
review at the time the new rule was announced.38 
It was not until twenty-four years later that the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the flaws inherent in Linkletter.  Its major flaw was 
inconsistency.  In its 1989 Teague v. Lane decision, the Court explained that 
the application of the factors set forth in Linkletter resulted in different 
treatment of “similarly situated” defendants on direct review.39  The Court 
cited Johnson v. New Jersey, which held that the rule announced in Miranda v. 
Arizona would only be applied to trials beginning after the Miranda decision.40  
The Court observed that “[b]ecause the defendant in Johnson, like the 
defendants in Miranda, was on direct review of his conviction, the Court’s 
refusal to give Miranda retroactive effect resulted in unequal treatment of 
those who were similarly situated.”41 
The problem of inconsistency was not limited to defendants with cases 
pending on direct review; the problem was equally apparent in cases on 
collateral review.  For example, many courts applied the factors set out in 
Linkletter in order to determine the retroactivity of Edwards v. Arizona42 and 
held that the rule in Edwards was applicable retroactively to cases that had 
become final before Edwards was decided.43  However, three years after 
Edwards, the Supreme Court held in Solem v. Stumes that Edwards was not to 
be applied retroactively to such cases.44  The result was that those individuals 
who raised an Edwards claim on collateral review before the Stumes decision 
benefited from the holding in Edwards; the defendants who raised identical 
claims after Stumes were denied such a benefit.45 
Despite these problems, the Court continued to apply the Linkletter 
standard.  In Desist v. United States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
 
 37. For a discussion on the confusion of this issue at the time, see United States v. Johnson, 
457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982) (explaining that “[a]fter Linkletter and Shott, it appeared that all newly 
declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to 
judgments of conviction not yet final when the rule was established” (emphasis added)). 
 38. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97, 300-01 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
U.S. 719, 726-34 (1966). 
 39. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once a criminal suspect 
invokes his right to have counsel present during interrogation, counsel must be present before any 
further interrogation is conducted, unless communication is initiated by the suspect himself). 
 43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 304-05. 
 44. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 650 (1984). 
 45. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305. 
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consider the issue of whether its 1967 holding in Katz v. United States46 should 
be applied to illegal searches conducted prior to the date of the Katz decision 
— December 18, 1967.47  In Katz, the Supreme Court held that electronic 
surveillance of private conversations requires the approval of a magistrate and 
a showing of probable cause in order to comply with the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.48  The defendants in Desist were the subjects of an illegal 
eavesdropping operation under Katz standards.49  However, the surveillance at 
issue was conducted before the Katz decision, and the petitioners’ case was 
pending on direct review at the time Katz was announced.50  The Desist Court 
held that Katz should not be applied retroactively to such cases, reasoning that 
although Katz was a “clear break with the past,”51 the Linkletter factors 
supported non-retroactivity.52 
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist, which later proved highly influential in 
the formation of the doctrine of retroactivity,53 asserted that new constitutional 
rules should be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the 
Court announced the rule, notwithstanding any analysis of the factors used in 
Linkletter.54  Additionally, Justice Harlan discussed the complexity of the 
doctrine of retroactivity in habeas corpus cases.  He examined the distinct 
elements of these cases, which, he said, necessitate a rule of retroactivity 
“much more than the ‘purpose,’ ‘reliance,’ and judicial ‘administration’ 
standards which have so far been regarded as the tests governing retroactivity 
in direct review and habeas corpus cases alike.”55 
In its 1982 decision of United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court 
considered the first part of Harlan’s reasoning, which suggested that new 
constitutional rules should be applied “at a minimum” to cases pending on 
direct review at the time the rule was established.56  In addition, the Court 
assigned the rationale of Justice Harlan’s proposed rule to a large part of its 
majority opinion.57  The Johnson Court presented Harlan’s argument in three 
prongs: the current retroactivity doctrine “conflicts with the norm of principled 
decision making”; the practice of applying a new constitutional rule purely 
prospectively, making the exception for the particular fortunate litigant 
 
 46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 47. Desist v. United States, 294 U.S. 244, 246 (1969). 
 48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57. 
 49. Desist, 394 U.S. at 246. 
 50. Id. at 252, 254. 
 51. Id. at 248 (explaining that because the Katz holding was a “clear break” with precedent, 
the Court is “compelled” to address the issue of its retroactivity). 
 52. Id. at 249-52. 
 53. See Teague, 489 U.S. at  292; Johnson v. United States, 457 U.S. 537, 546-49 (1982). 
 54. Desist, 394 U.S. at  258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 260-69. 
 56. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 548. 
 57. See id. at 546-48. 
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presently before the court, is inconsistent with the Court’s model for judicial 
review; the rules of retroactivity utilized prior to Johnson had the effect of 
treating similarly situated defendants differently.58 
Ultimately, the Johnson Court held that a Supreme Court decision that 
interprets the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all cases not 
yet final at the time the decision is announced.59  However, the Court stressed 
that the holding did not apply to cases “clearly controlled by existing 
retroactivity precedents,” such as new rules that were a clear break with past 
precedent.60 
The final pre-Teague decision was Griffith v. Kentucky, which did away 
with the “clear-break” exception that had been enforced just five years earlier 
in Johnson.61  The Court explained that the clear-break exception was 
inappropriate because it placed an emphasis on the very type of case-specific 
analysis previously criticized and rejected by Justice Harlan.62  Additionally, 
the exception treated similarly situated defendants differently.63 
In sum, on the brink of the 1989 decision that would fundamentally alter 
the way the Court decided issues of retroactivity, the Supreme Court had 
created a doctrine that was centered on three factors and that had been altered 
and supplemented a number of times for various reasons. 
B. Teague and its Progeny 
Teague v. Lane, decided by the Supreme Court in 1989, established a new 
rule of retroactivity that has managed to persist despite the past tendency of the 
Court to alter its mode of attack with each retroactivity case presented to it.  In 
Teague, the Court decided whether Frank Teague could benefit from the 
reasoning of Taylor v. Louisiana, which held that the jury venire must be 
composed of a fair cross-section of the community.64  Although Taylor 
specifically held that this requirement did not apply to the petit jury itself,65 
Frank Teague nonetheless argued that the reasoning of Taylor should not be 
limited to the jury venire but also should be applicable to the petit jury.66  The 
Court, determining that such an understanding of Taylor would constitute a 
 
 58. Id. at 546-47. 
 59. Id. at 562. 
 60. Id. at 557-58, 562. 
 61. The Court concluded, “[w]e . . . hold that a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review 
or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with 
the past.”  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 
 62. Id. at 327. 
 63. Id. at 327-28. 
 64. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989). 
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“new rule,” declined to address the argument on the merits and held that the 
rule was not subject to retroactive application.67 
On a larger scale, the Teague Court admitted that it was finally “time to 
clarify how the question of retroactivity should be resolved for cases on 
collateral review”68 and held that new rules of law were not subject to 
retroactive application to convictions already final when the new rule was 
announced, unless the rule fit within one of two limited exceptions.69 
The plurality opinion commenced with a discussion of the threshold 
question in a retroactivity analysis: whether the rule at issue is a “new rule.”70  
While declining to “define the spectrum” of what constitutes a new rule for 
retroactivity purposes, the Court did offer one piece of guidance: “a case 
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the 
time the defendant’s conviction became final.”71  Concluding that the rule at 
issue in Teague did, in fact, constitute a “new rule,” the Court proceeded to its 
analysis of whether the fair cross-section rule was subject to retroactive 
application.72 
The Teague Court adopted Justice Harlan’s once dismissed view that, 
generally, new rules should not be subject to retroactive application in cases on 
collateral review and supported the decision with policy reasoning such as the 
need for finality.73  Ultimately the Court held that, subject to certain 
exceptions, new rules are not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review.74  The first exception applies to situations in which a rule places 
“certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”75  In analyzing the facts of 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 300. 
 69. Id. at 310. 
 70. Id. at 301. 
 71. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).  Subsequent cases have analyzed this 
threshold question in more detail.  See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).  The Butler 
Court explained that a decision that overrules a previous case should be characterized as a “new 
rule.”  Id. at 412.  However, the Court admitted that the inquiry is more challenging when a rule 
is based upon an “extension of the reasoning of previous cases.”  Id. at 412-13.  For instance, the 
defendant in Butler argued that the rule announced in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), 
from which he wished to benefit, was “merely an application [of a previous holding in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)] to a slightly different set of facts.”  Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that many times the determination of whether a holding is 
governed by a previous decision is reasonably debatable, and concluded that the rule at issue did 
in fact constitute a “new rule.”  Id. at 415. 
 72. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301-02. 
 73. “Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final 
seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal 
justice system.”  Id. at 309-10. 
 74. Id. at 310. 
 75. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). 
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Teague, the Court determined that the fair cross-section rule did not fit within 
this exception because the rule did not “accord constitutional protection to any 
primary activity whatsoever.”76 
Although the Teague Court offered little guidance to lower courts in 
applying this exception, as the application of the facts in Teague to the 
exception appeared in one short paragraph, later Supreme Court decisions have 
filled in this gap.  One such decision is Penry v. Lynaugh.77  In Penry, the 
Court discussed the retroactive effect of a rule that rendered it unconstitutional 
to execute a mentally retarded person with the reasoning capacity of a seven-
year old.78  The Court determined that if such a rule were created by the Court, 
it would be retroactive in effect because it would satisfy the first exception to 
the Teague rule.79  The Court went on to say that “the first exception set forth 
in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal 
punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain 
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense.”80  This is the only time that the Court has held such a rule to satisfy 
the first exception.81 
In Teague, the Court provided another way in which a “new rule” could be 
subject to retroactive application to cases on collateral review: where the new 
rule mandates that a court observe a procedure “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”82  The Court supplemented the second exception with a 
requirement that the rule be a “bedrock procedural element,” without which the 
fundamental fairness underlying a conviction would be undermined and the 
accuracy of the conviction diminished.83  The fair cross-section rule at issue in 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 328-29.  The Court actually held, on the merits, that the Eighth Amendment did not 
preclude “the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry’s ability convicted of a capital 
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone.”  Id. at 340.  This holding was 
overturned by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 79. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Examples of cases holding the first Teague exception inapplicable include Sawyer v. 
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990); and Butler v. 
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).  However, because the Penry Court did not, in fact, create 
such a new rule, the issue of retroactivity was moot.  See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. 
 82. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 83. Id. at 315.  The Court explained that: 
because the absence of a fair cross section on the jury venire does not undermine the 
fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood 
of obtaining an accurate conviction, we conclude that a rule requiring that petit juries be 
composed of a fair cross section of the community would not be a ‘bedrock procedural 
element’ that would be retroactively applied under the second exception we have 
articulated. 
Id. 
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Teague was, according to the Court, a “far cry from the kind of absolute 
prerequisite to fundamental fairness that is ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”84  In fact, Justice O’Connor’s opinion set the bar high for rules that 
would fit within this exception.  She asserted that “[b]ecause we operate from 
the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate 
determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such 
components of basic due process have yet to emerge.”85 
Sawyer v. Smith, decided in 1990, provides guidance in applying the 
second Teague exception.  The facts of Sawyer are as follows: a man was 
convicted and sentenced to death for the mutilation and murder of a guest in 
his home.86  The prosecutor’s closing statement to the jury during the penalty 
phase of trial included the following language: 
Don’t feel like you are the one, because it is very easy for defense lawyers to 
try and make each and every one of you feel like you are pulling the switch.  
That is not so . . . believe me there will be others who will be behind you to 
either agree with you or to say you are wrong.87 
Over a year after Robert Sawyer’s conviction was final, the Supreme Court 
decided in Caldwell v. Mississippi that it is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to allow imposition of the death penalty where the sentencing 
body believes that it is not responsible for the determination of whether to 
impose the capital sentence.88  Thus, Sawyer filed a federal habeas corpus 
petition, arguing that the closing argument of the prosecutor violated the 
Eighth Amendment “by diminishing the jury’s sense of responsibility for the 
capital sentencing decision.”89 
The Court held that the rule announced in Caldwell did not satisfy the 
second Teague exception, rejecting Sawyer’s assertion that the second 
exception applied because the new rule improved the accuracy of capital 
sentences.90  The Court stressed that the second exception combines the 
“accuracy element” with the requirement that the newly announced rule be a 
“watershed rule of fundamental fairness.”91  Furthermore, “[i]t is thus not 
enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy 
of trial . . . .  A rule that qualifies under this exception must . . . also ‘alter our 
 
 84. Id. at 314. 
 85. Id. at 313. 
 86. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 229-30. 
 87. Id. at 231-32 (quoting the record). 
 88. Id. at 233 (discussing the Court’s holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985)). 
 89. Id. at 232. 
 90. Id. at 242. 
 91. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242. 
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understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding.’”92 
Saffle v. Parks, decided in 1990, also provided a narrow reading of the 
second exception.  The Court explained that an appropriate illustration of the 
type of rule that satisfies the second Teague exception is Gideon v. 
Wainwright, which held that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel in 
trials for serious offenses.93  The Saffle Court ultimately held that the rule 
allowing a defendant’s sentence to be determined by the emotions of the jury 
did not fall within the second exception to Teague because: (1) the rule lacked 
the “primacy and centrality” of the Gideon rule, and (2) such a rule does not 
promote the policies of fairness and accuracy, which are the bases for the 
exception.94 
As evident from the history provided above, several post-Teague Supreme 
Court decisions have interpreted, explained, and clarified the Teague rule.95  
Bousley v. United States, decided by the Supreme Court in 1998, exemplified 
one crucial point of the Teague doctrine: the Teague bar against retroactivity is 
only applicable to procedural rules.96  The Bousley Court explained that after a 
Supreme Court decision has been found to be a “new rule,” the threshold 
question in a Teague analysis is whether the new rule is procedural or 
substantive, as the Teague bar against retroactivity applies only to procedural 
rules.97 
In Bousley, the issue was whether the Supreme Court’s 1995 holding in 
Bailey v. United States98 should be applied retroactively to Kenneth Bousley’s 
1990 conviction under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1), which made it a crime to 
“knowingly and intentionally use[ ] . . . firearms during and in relation to a 
drug trafficking crime.”99  While Bousley’s appeal from a dismissal of his 
petition for habeas corpus was pending, the Court decided Bailey and held that 
“use” of a firearm under section 924(c)(1) required “active employment” of the 
 
 92. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). 
 93. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (discussing the holding in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. As discussed above, Penry, Sawyer, and Saffle served to explain and interpret the 
exceptions to the Teague bar against retroactivity.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); 
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 484.  In addition, Butler clarified the threshold 
question of whether a case announced a “new rule” for purposes of Teague retroactivity.  See 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). 
 96. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
 99. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616-18. 
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firearm.100  The Court held that the question of whether the Bailey rule should 
be applied retroactively to Bousley was not governed by Teague because it was 
a question of substantive law.101  The Court went on to say that “because 
Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it is inapplicable 
to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute 
enacted by Congress.”102 
C. Where the Rule Stands Now 
The doctrine of retroactivity as it currently stands can be explained very 
simply — if a new rule of criminal procedure is announced after a criminal 
defendant’s conviction is final, that individual will likely not benefit from the 
rule.  Although the possibility always exists that the rule could fit into one of 
the Teague exceptions, the odds of that happening are low.  Only once has the 
Supreme Court declared that a rule satisfied the first exception, and never has 
it held a rule to satisfy the second exception.103  This track record, although 
seemingly harsh, is consistent with the original holding of Teague: new rules 
of criminal procedure will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review unless they fit within one of two narrow exceptions. 
III.  ANALYSIS — SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Judge Thomas introduced his opinion in Summerlin v. Stewart with a 
colorful commentary on the facts: “[i]t is the raw material from which legal 
fiction is forged . . . [b]ut, as Mark Twain observed, ‘truth is often stranger 
than fiction because fiction has to make sense.’”104  The facts are as follows.  
An investigator of delinquent accounts for Finance America, Brenna Bailey, 
arrived at the home of Warren Summerlin, an “extremely troubled man” who 
was severely mistreated as a child; had been diagnosed with organic brain 
dysfunction, explosive personality disorder with impaired impulse control, and 
paranoid schizophrenia; and was, according to a psychiatrist, functionally 
retarded.105  When Bailey never returned from work, her boyfriend retraced her 
work route and discovered that Summerlin’s home was the last place that she 
had visited.  The next day, Bailey’s body was found in the trunk of her car, 
which was parked outside of a market.106 
 
 100. Id. at 617.  “[A]ctive employment includes uses such as ‘brandishing, displaying, 
bartering, striking with, and . . . firing or attempting to fire’. . . but does not include mere 
possession of a firearm.”  Id. (quoting Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148). 
 101. Id. at 620. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Part IV.B.  For cases holding the second Teague exception inapplicable, see 
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494-95; and Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. 
 104. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 105. Id. at 1084-85. 
 106. Id. at 1085. 
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Summerlin was convicted of first-degree murder and sexual assault.107  In 
a separate proceeding after the jury’s verdict, the judge found the existence of 
two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances and sentenced 
Summerlin to death in accordance with the Arizona statute.108  The statutory 
aggravating factors included Summerlin’s prior conviction involving threats of 
violence and that he had committed the murder in “an especially heinous, 
cruel, or depraved manner.”109 
On October 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the district court’s denial of Summerlin’s motion to vacate judgment.110  
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the sentencing judge 
was competent to impose the death penalty.111  However, before that issue 
could be resolved, the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, which held that 
the very statute under which Summerlin was sentenced violated the Sixth 
Amendment.112  Consequentially, the question of whether the holding in Ring 
could be applied retroactively to Summerlin shot back up to the Ninth Circuit. 
A. Majority Opinion 
Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Summerlin sets out the 
structural analysis of the doctrine of retroactivity currently in effect.113  The 
Summerlin Court condensed the scattered law of recent Supreme Court 
holdings on the doctrine and provided a step-by-step process for determining 
questions of retroactivity.114  Foremost, the threshold question of Bousley must 
be decided: If the newly-announced rule is substantive, the Teague bar does 
not apply; if the rule is procedural, the question of retroactivity is based upon a 
three-step analysis.115  The first step requires the deciding court to determine 
the date on which the conviction became final.  The next step is to determine 
whether, on the date of the final conviction, governing precedent compelled a 
determination that the Constitution mandated the rule.  If the rule was required 
by the Constitution on that date, there is no Teague bar against retroactivity, as 
the rule in question is not characterized as a “new rule.”116  If the rule was not 
constitutionally mandated when the conviction became final, the bar against 
 
 107. Id. at 1088. 
 108. Id. at 1090.  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (2004). 
 109. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090. 
 110. Id. at 1091. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. However, as argued below, it is the court’s application of that analysis to the facts of 
Summerlin that is flawed.  See infra Part IV. 
 114. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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retroactivity governs, and the court must then determine as the last step 
whether either of the two exceptions provided in Teague are applicable.117 
After providing a thorough account of the history of the doctrine of 
retroactivity, the majority in Summerlin provided two independent and 
alternative legal theories which support a conclusion that Ring v. Arizona is 
subject to retroactive application.  The Ninth Circuit’s first independent 
argument is that Ring is a substantive rule of law and therefore is not subject to 
the bar against retroactivity announced in Teague v. Lane.118  The court 
admitted that “in one sense,” the rule announced in Ring is procedural, just as 
the rule announced in Ring’s predecessor, Apprendi, is procedural.119  
However, the court distinguished Ring from Apprendi, explaining that Ring, 
unlike Apprendi, announced a rule that is substantive in nature “even if its 
form is partially procedural.”120 
The majority centered this proposition on its definition of procedural and 
substantive rules, explaining that procedural rules implicate the functions of 
the trial processes, while substantive rules decide the “meaning, scope, and 
application of substantive criminal statutes.”121  The Ninth Circuit also cited its 
own holding in United States v. Montalvo,122 which declared that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Richardson v. United States announced a substantive rule of 
law.123  The effect of Richardson was to mandate that juries unanimously 
decide which violations constitute a “continuing series of violations” under 21 
U.S.C. section 848(a), the statute making it a crime to engage in continuing 
criminal enterprises.124  The Summerlin Court recalled that because the 
Richardson rule explained or redefined the elements of a criminal offense, it 
was substantive in nature.125 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit asserted that “[m]ore than a procedural 
holding, Ring effected a redefinition of Arizona capital murder law, restoring, 
as a matter of substantive law, an earlier Arizona legal paradigm in which 
murder and capital murder are separate substantive offenses with different 
essential elements and different forms of potential punishment.”126  In other 
words, the holding in Ring turned the statutory aggravating factors into 
substantive elements of a new crime — capital murder.  Ultimately, the Ninth 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1108. 
 119. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1101-02. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1100. 
 122. United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 123. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100. 
 124. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815 (1999). 
 125. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100-01. 
 126. Id. at 1102. 
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Circuit insisted that because the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring is 
substantive in nature, the Teague bar is inapplicable.127 
In the alternative, the Summerlin Court held that even if the Ring rule is not 
substantive, it falls within the second exception to the presumption against 
retroactivity announced in Teague, which allows retroactive application where 
the new rule “requires the observance of those procedures that . . . are ‘implicit 
in the concepts of ordered liberty.’”128 
In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit made its way through the three-step 
analysis outlined above.129  First, the court determined that Summerlin’s 
conviction became final in 1984 and asked whether the existing precedent in 
1984 dictated the result in Ring.130  The court asserted that a state court in 1984 
would not have acted “objectively unreasonably” by not applying the Ring rule 
at that time.131  More importantly, the majority accurately quoted Supreme 
Court precedent holding that decisions “expressly overrul[ing]”132 previous 
decisions indisputably announce “new rule[s]”133 and cited Ring as such a 
holding.134  For these reasons, the court determined that Ring announced a 
“new rule” and proceeded to the third step — an analysis of the Teague 
exceptions. 
The majority quickly dismissed the first exception, stating that Ring did 
not place the conduct of first-degree murder beyond the law-making authority 
to proscribe, nor did it immunize individuals from the death penalty.135  
However, the court did determine that the rule announced in Ring both 
enhances the accuracy of the criminal proceeding and “alters our 
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the 
proceeding,” as required for the second exception per Sawyer v. Smith.136  The 
majority provided a lengthy argument detailing how the rule announced in 
Ring improves the accuracy of capital murder sentences.137  Specifically, the 
court reasoned that the arguments and presentations made during the 
sentencing phase to juries are more formal and better prepared than those made 
to judges.138  Furthermore, presentations to juries prevent the introduction of 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 
U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 129. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099 (outlining the analytical framework of a Teague question). 
 130. Id. at 1108. 
 131. Id. at 1109 (quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997)). 
 132. Id. (discussing the holding in Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108-09 (explaining that Ring overturned Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990)). 
 135. Id. at 1109. 
 136. Id. at 1116, 1121; Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990). 
 137. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1110-15. 
 138. Id. at 1112. 
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inadmissible evidence, thus reducing the risk of an unwarranted capital 
sentence.139  Finally, juries, as “microcosms” of the community, appropriately 
“maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system,”140 are not habituated to the process of capital sentencing,141 and are 
less influenced by external factors such as elections.142 
The majority also determined that the Ring rule satisfies the second 
requirement to the second Teague exception in that it alters understanding of a 
bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of a criminal 
proceeding.143  The court first argued that because Ring error is not subject to 
harmless-error analysis and constitutes structural error, or a “defect affecting 
the framework within which the trial proceeds,” it logically alters the 
understanding of a procedural element of capital sentencing.144 
Next, the court asked whether Ring was a “watershed” case in accordance 
with the second Teague exception.  It set out the legal standard of a 
“watershed” ruling to be one that is ground-breaking and one that enhances 
accuracy and fairness and “dictate[s] observance of those procedures that . . . 
are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”145  In arguing that Ring is 
groundbreaking, the Ninth Circuit compared the impact of Ring to the impact 
of the “Mills/McKoy Rule,”146 which has been determined by some circuits to 
be a watershed rule.147  The court then reasoned that because Ring declared 
judges constitutionally unqualified to impose a capital sentence and altered 
 
 139. Id. at 1110-13. 
 140. Id. at 1113 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.15 (1968)). 
 141. Id. at 1114. 
 142. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1115.  The majority also pointed out that, considering the 
accusations that Judge Marquardt, Summerlin’s sentencing judge, was under the influence of 
marijuana during the trial, Summerlin’s sentence arguably would have been more accurate if a 
jury was responsible for the sentencing.  Id. at 1115-16.  The majority opinion provided that 
“[t]he amount of marijuana that Judge Marquardt may have used during the trial or deliberations 
is unknown because the district court did not allow discovery on this issue, although there is 
record support for Summerlin’s claim that Judge Marquardt was either having difficulty 
concentrating or experiencing memory loss.”  Id. at 1090.  The majority stressed, however, that 
the circumstances of Summerlin’s sentencing proceedings are not representative of other 
sentencing proceedings and other state trial judges.  Id. at 1115. 
 143. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990). 
 144. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1116-19 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 
(1991)). 
 145. Id. at 1119 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 146. The Ninth Circuit provided that the Mills/McKoy rule, derived from the holdings in Mills 
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), “struck 
down state procedures that limited any given juror’s consideration of mitigating circumstances in 
capital sentencing to such evidence that the entire jury had found relevant.”  Summerlin, 341 F.3d 
at 1120 n.21. 
 147. Id. at 1120. 
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bedrock principles of death penalty trials, it “redefined the structural 
safeguards implicit in our concept of ordered liberty.”148 
In sum, because the Ninth Circuit found that both requirements of the 
second exception are satisfied, the court held that even if the rule announced in 
Ring is procedural and not substantive, the Teague presumption against 
retroactivity is overcome because the rule fits squarely within an exception to 
the presumption provided by the terms of Teague itself.149 
The final portion of the majority opinion in Summerlin is dedicated to an 
acknowledgment of, and counter-argument to, the dissenting opinion.  First, 
the majority reiterated its distinction between Ring and Apprendi, which was 
held by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes to be non-
retroactive in effect.150  The court explained that one difference between the 
two cases, which in effect renders Ring substantive, is that Ring declared the 
statute in question unconstitutional; Apprendi did not.151  Next, the court 
argued that Apprendi errors, unlike Ring errors, are subject to harmless-error 
analysis.152  The court’s third point of distinction was that the rule in Apprendi 
did not satisfy the two prongs of the second Teague exception: enhancement of 
accuracy and classification as a watershed rule.  The Ninth Circuit explained 
that the Apprendi rule was not a “sweeping rule” for purposes of the Teague 
exception because it applies in only a narrow set of cases.153  The fourth point 
of distinction between Apprendi and Ring, according to the Ninth Circuit, was 
the structural differences between capital and non-capital trials.154  Finally, the 
court noted the “heightened analysis” demanded by the Eighth Amendment in 
capital trials.155  The majority opinion ends with the simple assertion that the 
retroactive effect of Apprendi does not govern the court’s determination of the 
retroactivity of Ring.156  This topic appears abundantly in the debate over 
whether Ring is retroactive. 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Rawlinson157 centered his dissent in Summerlin on two propositions: 
(1) that Ring announced a procedural rule of law, and (2) that Ring does not 
 
 148. Id. at 1120-21. 
 149. Id. at 1121. 
 150. See United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2002); Summerlin, 
341 F.3d at 1121 (explaining, “[o]ur analysis in Sanchez-Cervantes does not conflict with our 
conclusion that Ring must be applied retroactively”). 
 151. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (quoting Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 669). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121. 
 157. Rawlinson was joined by Circuit Judges O’Scannlain and Tallman.  Id. at 1125. 
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satisfy the second exception of Teague v. Lane.  Rawlinson argued that 
because of Ring’s “reliance upon and similarity to” Apprendi, it cannot be 
found to announce a substantive rule of law when Apprendi has been 
determined by the Ninth Circuit to announce a procedural rule of law.158  
Rawlinson wisely and perceptively focused on what he calls the “linchpin” of 
the majority’s rationale that Ring is distinguished from Apprendi as a 
substantive rule of law: that “Arizona’s enumerated aggravated factors 
[necessary for imposition of the death penalty] operate as the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense.”159  Judge Rawlinson invalidated 
this argument by pointing out that the Supreme Court itself stated that the hate-
crime aggravating factor in Apprendi had the same effect as the aggravators in 
Ring of creating an element of a greater offense.160 
Thus, the very point of distinction relied upon by the majority — the very 
thing that the majority stated is different about Ring and Apprendi — is one of 
the characteristics that the Supreme Court has stated is the same about Ring 
and Apprendi.  Furthermore, because the premise of the majority’s argument 
that Ring is substantive lies upon the fact that Ring can be distinguished from 
Apprendi in that Ring created a separate criminal offense of capital murder, the 
majority’s argument is ineffective.161  The dissent reinforced this argument 
with a discussion of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions in Cannon v. 
Mullin and Turner v. Crosby,162 noting that both the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits based their determinations that Ring announced a procedural rule on 
Ring’s “status as an extension of Apprendi.”163 
Next, in adhering to the structure employed by the majority, the dissent 
argued that the rule announced in Ring is not subject to retroactive application 
 
 158. Id. at 1125-27 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 1126 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)) (brackets in original). 
 160. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1126.  In fact, the Summerlin dissent pointed out that the Ring 
opinion quoted Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Apprendi, which stated, “if the legislature 
defines some core crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a 
finding of some aggravating fact, the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an 
aggravated crime . . . . The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated crime.”  Id. (quoting 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 605). 
 161. Id.  The dissent asserted: 
merely saying that creation of a separate substantive criminal offense renders a rule one of 
substance rather than procedure does not make it so.  If that were true, Apprendi would 
have been a substantive rather than a procedural ruling.  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Ring, the “hate crime” aggravator in Apprendi operated in the same manner as the death 
penalty factors . . . to establish a “greater offense.” 
Id. at 1126. 
 162. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
 163. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1128-29 (quoting Turner, 339 F.3d at 1248 and discussing 
Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994). 
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because it is not covered by either exception provided in Teague v. Lane.  The 
dissent explained that neither requirement of the second exception is satisfied.  
First, the Ring rule did not “seriously enhance[] the accuracy” of the death 
penalty proceedings; although there might be imperfections in judge-
determined sentences, “juries have their own problems in the capital 
sentencing context.”164  This conclusion was based on the results of The 
Capital Jury Project, a study of jury-determined death penalty sentences that 
was funded by the National Science Foundation.165  Among the many 
“problems” cited in the study is the tendency of juries to resolve indecisive 
deliberations in favor of death.166  The study also showed that many jurors 
prematurely decide the punishment of the defendant, before the guilt stage of 
the trial, before the judge delivers jury instructions regarding the punishment 
decision, and before both sides have had the opportunity to present evidence or 
arguments on the appropriate sentence.167 
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the Ring rule did not fulfill the 
second prong of the second Teague exception, which requires that the new rule 
alter the understanding of bedrock procedural principles.  The opinion states, 
“Ring’s application is limited to capital cases in [nine] states, a far cry from the 
majority’s ambitious description of Ring as ‘affect[ing] the structure of every 
capital trial.’”168  In conclusion, Judge Rawlinson announced that the majority 
opinion “is not compatible with Supreme Court precedent, our prior rulings, or 
the law of our sister circuits”169 and accused the majority of causing “an 
unwarranted circuit split.”170 
C. The Circuit Split: An Analysis of Cannon v. Mullin and Turner v. Crosby 
Not only has the Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with the holding of the 
Summerlin majority,171 but the Ninth Circuit is also in the minority among 
federal circuit courts.  At the time of the Summerlin opinion, both the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits had determined that the rule announced in Ring v. 
Arizona was not retroactive in effect.  Although neither opinion matched the 
length of the Summerlin decision, Cannon v. Mullin and Turner v. Crosby 
presented persuasive arguments opposing retroactivity. 
 
 164. Id. at 1129. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1129-30. 
 168. Id. at 1132. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2003). 
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1. Cannon v. Mullin 
In Cannon, the Tenth Circuit was presented with the question of the 
constitutionality of Oklahoma’s death penalty statute in light of the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Apprendi and Ring.172  Oklahoma’s death penalty statue, 
unlike the statute at issue in Ring, did require that the jury find beyond a 
reasonable doubt the statutory aggravating circumstances required for 
imposition of the death penalty.173  However, the Oklahoma statute further 
provided that if any aggravating circumstances were outweighed by one or 
more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty would not be imposed.174  
The statute did not require the finding that mitigating circumstances outweigh 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.175 
The appellant’s argument in Cannon for the retroactive effect of Ring was 
premised on two legal theories.  He first argued precisely what the Ninth 
Circuit later held in Summerlin: the rule announced in Ring is not governed by 
Teague because it is substantive.176  The Tenth’s Circuit’s response to this 
argument was precisely the response of the Summerlin dissenting opinion: the 
rule announced in Ring is “simply an extension” of the rule announced in 
Apprendi, and because the Apprendi doctrine had been determined to be a rule 
of procedure, Ring is thereby a rule of procedure.177 
The appellant also argued that the Supreme Court “has made Ring 
retroactive to cases on collateral review.”178  The court interpreted Cannon’s 
argument to assert that the Ring and Apprendi rules are “watershed” rules of 
criminal procedure within the meaning of the second Teague exception.179  The 
court’s response was simple: the Supreme Court, per Tyler v. Cain,180 has 
declared that the only way a new rule can be given retroactive effect to cases 
on collateral review is by action of the Supreme Court in the form of a judicial 
holding.181  In this sense, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is quite different from the 
analyses in Summerlin and Turner.  The Tenth Circuit argued that the 
appropriate question to determine the retroactivity of a new rule to habeas 
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) is not whether the rule fits 
into a Teague exception, but rather whether any specific language in Supreme 
 
 172. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 173. Id. at 991-92. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 992. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994. 
 178. Id. at 992. 
 179. Id. at 993. 
 180. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
 181. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 993.  “[T]he mere fact [that] a new rule might fall within the 
general parameters of overarching retroactivity principles established by the Supreme Court (i.e., 
Teague) is not sufficient.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
656 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:635 
Court decisions has declared the rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.  
Because Cannon failed to identify a Supreme Court case containing such 
specific language, the Tenth Circuit rejected his argument and held that the 
rule announced in Ring was not to be applied retroactively to Cannon’s habeas 
corpus petition.182 
2. Turner v. Crosby 
One year after the Cannon decision and just weeks before the Summerlin 
opinion was announced, the Eleventh Circuit heard William Turner’s appeal 
from a district court decision to deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
The facts leading to Turner’s conviction and death sentence are as follows.  
Turner, in the presence of their seven-year old daughter, murdered his wife.183  
That same day, in front of about forty people on the street and the fifteen-year 
old daughter of the victim, he stabbed his wife’s friend with whom his wife 
and children were living.184  Turner was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
murder by a jury.185  During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was 
instructed that it was to “advise the Court as to what punishment should be 
imposed upon the defendant,” based upon a finding of aggravating 
circumstances “to justify the imposition of the death penalty” or mitigating 
circumstances “to outweigh any aggravating circumstances.”186  The trial judge 
adopted the advisory sentence of the jury and sentenced Turner to death for the 
second murder.187 
After unsuccessful attempts to appeal, to file a motion for Post Conviction 
Relief, and to file a state habeas corpus petition, Turner filed a federal habeas 
corpus petition, which was also denied.188  The Eleventh Circuit granted a 
certificate of appealability to determine (1) whether, as a procedural matter, 
Turner was entitled to argue a Sixth Amendment violation under Ring, and (2) 
whether Ring is subject to retroactive application to cases on collateral 
review.189  The court first determined that because Turner failed to raise his 
Sixth Amendment claim in the state court proceedings, he was barred from 
bringing the claim in federal court “absent a showing of cause for and actual 
prejudice from the default.”190 
 
 182. Id. at 993-94. 
 183. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1261. 
 186. Id. at 1264.  Florida’s death penalty system, like that of Oklahoma, can be described as a 
“hybrid” structure: the judge determines the sentence after hearing the recommendation of the 
jury. 
 187. Id. at 1267. 
 188. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1269-73. 
 189. Id. at 1273. 
 190. Id. at 1280. 
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Secondly, the court held that the rule announced in Ring does not apply 
retroactively to Turner’s habeas petition.  The court began its analysis on 
retroactivity with the notion that because the Eleventh Circuit had held in 
McCoy v. United States191 that Apprendi announced a new rule of criminal 
procedure, did not fit within any of the Teague exceptions, and therefore did 
not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, Ring likewise should not 
be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.192  The court then went 
through a step-by-step analysis of the doctrine of retroactivity, determining 
first that the rule announced in Ring was a new rule of criminal procedure 
under Teague.193  The court explained that Ring, in determining “only who 
decides” aggravating or mitigating circumstances for imposition of the death 
penalty, left unaltered the prosecutor’s burden of proof, the underlying conduct 
of the offense, and the necessary factors for a finding of aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances.194  To conclude the first step in its analysis, the court 
articulated an argument common to the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and 
the Summerlin dissent: “[o]ur conclusion that Ring announces a procedural rule 
is bolstered by Ring’s status as an extension of Apprendi.”195 
The next step in the Turner Court’s retroactivity analysis was a 
determination of whether the Ring rule falls into either of the Teague 
exceptions.  The court stated that Ring did not satisfy the standard for the first 
exception — decriminalizing conduct or prohibiting a certain form of 
punishment for a class of individuals.196  Additionally, in reliance upon the 
narrow interpretation of the exception given in Sawyer v. Smith, the court also 
determined that Ring did not meet the second exception of announcing a 
“watershed” rule of criminal procedure.197 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of this second exception, like the analysis 
of the Summerlin court, rested upon two prongs: the rule must “seriously 
diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction” and must “alter 
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness 
of a proceeding.”198  With respect to the first prong, the court came to the 
conclusion that the rule announced in Ring would have little to no impact on 
 
 191. McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256-58 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 192. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1283. 
 193. Id. at 1284-85. 
 194. Id. at 1284 (emphasis in original). 
 195. Id.  “Just as Apprendi ‘constitutes a procedural rule because it dictates what fact-finding 
procedure must be employed,’ Ring constitutes a procedural rule because it dictates what fact-
finding procedure must be employed in a capital sentencing hearing.”  Turner, 339 F.3d at 1284.  
The court went on to say, “[w]e agree with other courts who have concluded that because 
Apprendi was a procedural rule, it axiomatically follows that Ring is also a procedural rule.”  Id. 
 196. Id. at 1285. 
 197. Id. at 1285-86. 
 198. Id. at 1285 (emphasis in original). 
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the accuracy of the proceeding.199  The court also considered the purpose of the 
Ring rule, which is to guard the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an 
impartial jury, and not the “need to enhance accuracy or fairness of the fact-
finding in a capital sentencing context.”200  Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that because Ring did not satisfy the requirements for either Teague 
exception and Turner’s conviction became final before the Ring rule was 
announced, Turner would not benefit from the rule requiring a jury to 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of aggravating factors 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.201 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
A. The Three Flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s Analysis of “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Context of Retroactivity 
1. A Distinction that is “Difficult to Locate” 
In the eyes of a layperson, the distinction between a procedural rule of law 
and a substantive rule of law may not seem enormously complex.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines procedural law, as opposed to substantive law, as “[t]he 
rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as 
opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.”202  
Unfortunately, the practical distinction between “substance” and “procedure” 
is much more complicated than the words in the definition, and the meanings 
of “substantive” rules of law and “procedural” rules of law are different 
depending upon the legal context.  Thus, in order to understand the distinction 
in different areas of the law, one must look to court precedent defining the 
terms in the relevant context.  Such searches at times can be unfruitful, 
considering the lack of legal writing and clarity on the general topic.203 
With the exception of Bousley, the Supreme Court has not provided much 
guidance on how to distinguish rules of substance from rules of procedure in 
the context of retroactivity.  Consequentially, the Court’s reasoning in Bousley 
 
 199. “Pre-Ring sentencing procedure does not diminish the likelihood of a fair sentencing 
hearing; instead, Ring’s new rule, at most, would shift the fact-finding duties during Turner’s 
penalty phase from (a) an impartial judge after an advisory verdict by a jury to (b) an impartial 
jury alone.”  Turner, 339 F.3d at 1286. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (7th ed. 1999). 
 203. Even the Summerlin Court admits that the distinction is difficult to locate.  Summerlin v. 
Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1100 (9th Cir. 2003).  See also Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Is Ring Retroactive?, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1828 (explaining that “[r]elatively little has been written about the 
distinction between substantive and procedural law in general”); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 
509 (1973) (explaining that rules will not be easily classified as rules of substance or procedure). 
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is crucial to an understanding of the doctrine of retroactivity as it currently 
stands.  In Bousley, the Court found that the rule announced in Bailey, which 
defined the “use” of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1) as “active 
employment,” rather than mere possession, was a rule of substantive law.204  
The Court determined that the Bailey rule is one of substantive law because it 
interpreted the meaning of a criminal statute.205  However, the rationale did not 
stop there.  The Court made the distinction between procedural rules of law 
and substantive rules of law based upon what it called the “doctrinal 
underpinnings of habeas review.”206 
One such underpinning, the Court explained, is the need to combat the risk 
“that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make 
criminal.’”207  For this reason, the bar against retroactivity does not extend to 
Supreme Court decisions “holding that a substantive federal criminal statute 
does not reach certain conduct.”208  Based upon its consideration of these 
“underpinnings,” the Bousley Court determined the Bailey rule to be 
substantive.209 
Bousley provides some guidance in determining whether the rule 
announced in Ring is procedural or substantive.  However, as evident from the 
circuit split, the distinction between procedural rules and substantive rules in 
the context of Teague retroactivity is far from resolved.  This section will 
argue that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that Ring announced a substantive 
rule of law, which is not subject to the restrictions of Teague v. Lane, is flawed 
in three respects. 
2. The Ninth Circuit Fails to Adhere to the Rationale of Bousley 
The Ninth Circuit used the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist to support its 
holding that Ring is a substantive rule of law and therefore is not bound by 
Teague: “[b]ecause Teague by its terms only applies to procedural rules . . . [it] 
is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a 
criminal statue.”210  However, the Ninth Circuit failed to look beyond the 
words of this statement to the context in which the statement is used and the 
rationale of the Supreme Court in arriving at the Bousley holding. 
The Bousley Court found the Bailey rule to be substantive in nature 
because it would be inconsistent with the “underpinnings of habeas review” to 
 
 204. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 617, 620 (1998) (discussing Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995)). 
 205. Id. at 620. 
 206. Id. at 621. 
 207. Id. at 620. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. 
 210. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620). 
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not allow Bousley to use the rule in his habeas argument.211  In other words, 
because the Bailey holding stated that the act of merely possessing a firearm 
was not a crime under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1), Bailey should not be 
punished for merely possessing a firearm.  This is what the Court means when 
it speaks of an “act that the law does not make criminal.”  This is what the 
Court means when it speaks of “interpreting the meaning of a substantive 
federal statute.” 
Considering the rationale of Bousley, the Summerlin Court’s assertion that 
Ring is substantive because it “effected a redefinition of Arizona capital 
murder law” is not convincing.  Nothing in the Ring rule stated that murdering 
someone in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner is no longer a 
crime for which someone can be executed.  The Ring rule merely stated that 
the jury must determine what constitutes “heinous, cruel, or depraved.” 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning would be more persuasive if the Bousley 
Court had said the following: the Bailey rule is substantive because although 
“mere possession of a firearm” still constitutes “use of a firearm” under 18 
U.S.C. section 924(c)(1), the Bailey rule now requires “mere possession” to be 
determined by the jury instead of the judge.  Likewise, the Summerlin Court’s 
reasoning would have been more persuasive if the Ring Court had held that the 
act of committing murder in an especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved” 
manner no longer constituted an aggravating factor for which the death penalty 
could be imposed. 
Similar reasoning is found in the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the rule 
announced in United States v. Gaudin was a rule of procedure.212  In Gaudin, 
the Supreme Court announced that the element of “materiality” needed to 
establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1001 was to be decided by the jury 
rather than the judge.213  Two years after Gaudin was decided, the Fifth Circuit 
held the rule to be one of criminal procedure, reasoning that “Gaudin did not 
change what the government must prove; materiality was always an element of 
a section 1001 offense.  Instead, Gaudin changed the party to whom the 
government must prove materiality — from judge to jury.”214 
The rule announced in Ring is much like the rule announced in Gaudin.  
The presence of aggravating factors and the absence of mitigating factors is 
something that the government had always been required to show for 
imposition of the death penalty in Arizona.  The holding in Ring merely 
changed who is to determine such factors. 
 
 211. Id. at 621. 
 212. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).  The Fifth Circuit held that the Gaudin 
rule was a rule of procedure in United States v. Shunk, 113 F.3d 31 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 213. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 506. 
 214. Shunk, 113 F.3d at 35. 
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In conclusion, because the Ring rule does not “prevent convictions based 
upon actions that law does not make criminal” in the same way that the Bailey 
rule did, it would be consistent with the underpinnings of collateral review and 
the doctrine of retroactivity to determine that the rule announced in Ring is a 
new rule of criminal procedure not to be applied retroactively. 
3. The Ninth Circuit Forgets that Rules of Procedure Are Governed by 
Teague 
The Ninth Circuit’s view is that Ring’s holding — although partly 
procedural — announced a substantive rule of law because it interpreted a 
criminal statute.215  The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, along with the Summerlin 
dissent, on the other hand, argue that the rule announced in Ring is one of 
procedure, quite simply, because the rule announced in Apprendi is one of 
procedure.216  The Eleventh Circuit added another layer of reasoning: the rule 
did not affect the burden of proof, the underlying conduct of the offense, and 
the necessary elements used to determine mitigating or aggravating factors.217  
Therefore, the newly-announced rule was not substantive. 
Admittedly, many people have agreed with the Summerlin Court’s 
assertion that the Ring rule is both procedural and substantive.  For instance, an 
article in the Capital Defense Journal explains that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Ring is “no doubt procedural . . . [because] it requires the jury, not 
the judge, to make factual findings during the sentencing phase.”218  The 
author goes on to say that the rule is also substantive because it makes 
aggravating factors “an element of a greater offense.”219  Likewise, another 
author asserts that the Ring rule “includes characteristics” of both substantive 
and procedural rules of law, explaining that the rule is substantive because it 
“redefined the elements of murder” and is procedural because it “merely orders 
the way in which a criminal trial is conducted.”220 
While an adoption of the middle-of-the-road approach may be quite 
tempting, especially in such a complex area of law, the reality is that the 
Supreme Court has not provided a separate rule governing the retroactivity of 
new rules that are partly procedural and partly substantive.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that new rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review unless the rule fits into two narrow 
exceptions.  This is a very straightforward rule.  If a rule is procedural, Teague 
bars its retroactive application.  If the Supreme Court had meant otherwise, it 
 
 215. See supra Part III.A. 
 216. See supra Parts III.B and C. 
 217. See supra Part III.C. 
 218. Janice L. Kopec, Daniels v. Lee, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 457, 464 (2003). 
 219. Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)). 
 220. Victoria Johnson, Elemental Facts: Did Ring v. Arizona Redefine Capital Sentencing?, 
16 REGENT U. L. REV. 191, 220 (2003-2004). 
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would have included a third exception to the Teague bar — one for hybrid 
rules that “in one sense” are procedural and can also be argued to be 
substantive.  Thus, because the rule announced in Ring is a new rule of 
criminal procedure — as even the Ninth Circuit admits that it is — it is subject 
to the restrictions in Teague. 
4. The Ninth Circuit Inadvertently Destroys its Lynchpin Argument 
The final flaw in the Summerlin Court’s distinction between substance and 
procedure in the Teague context is its failure to address the dissent’s response 
to its argument that Ring is substantive because it can be distinguished from 
Apprendi as creating a separate offense of capital murder.221  Considering 
contemporary thought on the doctrine of retroactivity at the time of the 
Summerlin decision, the need for the Ninth Circuit to make a distinction 
between Ring and Apprendi is obvious.  Apprendi was almost indisputably 
viewed as a rule of procedure that was subject to the Teague bar against 
retroactivity,222 and the holding in Ring was based upon, and was a direct 
response to, the rule of procedure announced in Apprendi.223  Thus, any 
assertion that Ring was substantive for Teague purposes bore the risk of 
appearing to be an evasion of common sense.224  The Ninth Circuit accordingly 
reconciled this disparity by stating that Ring could be distinguished from 
Apprendi because Ring, unlike Apprendi, created a separate substantive offense 
of capital murder.225 
As mentioned previously, the dissent invalidated the premise of the 
majority’s distinction by reminding the majority of the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that the hate crime aggravator in Apprendi also had the effect of 
creating a separate aggravated crime.226  Judge Rawlinson correctly concluded 
that this “linkage” between Ring and Apprendi is “fatal” to the majority’s 
reasoning.  Without an effective distinction between the rule announced in 
Apprendi and the rule announced in Ring, the majority’s argument not only 
 
 221. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that Apprendi was not a substantive rule of law.  
United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 222. The Supreme Court declared that its holding in Apprendi was procedural when it said, 
“[t]he substantive basis for New Jersey’s enhancement is . . . not at issue.”  Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000).  In addition, the Ninth Circuit admitted that Apprendi had “no 
impact on substantive criminal law.”  Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1101 (9th Cir. 2003).  
See also United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 
993 (8th Cir. 2001); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (all holding that 
Apprendi is not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review). 
 223. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overturning Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 693 (1990), because 
“Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable”). 
 224. See Towery, 64 P.3d at 833 (explaining that “[l]ogic dictates that if Apprendi announced 
a procedural rule, then, by extension, [Ring] did also”). 
 225. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1101. 
 226. See supra Part III.B. 
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haphazardly deviates from the current interpretation and application of the 
concept of Teague retroactivity evident in numerous holdings of the circuit 
courts, but it also, without explanation, directly contradicts its own holding in a 
previous case which the Ninth Circuit insists is still good law. 
B. The Second Teague Exception: Is the Ring Rule a “Component of 
Basic Due Process”? 
Teague allows new rules of procedure to be applied retroactively to cases 
on collateral review where the rule prohibits lawmakers from imposing a 
category of punishment on a class of individuals or from making a class of 
conduct illegal.227  The Summerlin Court correctly concluded that the Ring 
holding did neither of these things, as Ring did not prohibit imposition of the 
death penalty to a certain class of individuals, and did not decriminalize the act 
for which Summerlin was convicted — or any act for that matter.  The Ninth 
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Arizona Supreme Court are specifically 
in agreement on this point.228 
Teague also allows retroactive application of new rules of criminal 
procedure to cases already final where the rule is “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”229  Such a rule must be a “bedrock procedural element” 
without which fairness and accuracy is diminished.230  Justice O’Connor 
warned that it would be “unlikely that many such components of basic due 
process have yet to emerge,” and since the holding in Teague the Court has yet 
to find a rule that fits within the second exception.231  Despite this high 
standard, the Ninth Circuit in Summerlin ambitiously concluded that the Ring 
rule satisfied the second Teague exception. 
The Summerlin Court came to this conclusion after arguing two points.  
First, the court argued that the Ring rule enhances the accuracy of capital 
sentences, and thus fulfills the exception’s requirement of accuracy.232  Next, 
the court argued that Ring is a “watershed rule that alters our understanding of 
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the trial” for two 
reasons: (1) Ring is not susceptible to harmless error analysis, and (2) the Ring 
rule is “groundbreaking” because it “affects the structure of every capital trial 
and has rendered unconstitutional every substantive statute in conflict with its 
dictates.”233 
In truth, the second exception to the rule announced in Teague is a narrow 
exception and has been applied in a manner very different from the application 
 
 227. See supra Part II.B. 
 228. See supra Parts III.A and C; Towery, 64 P.3d at 833. 
 229. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989). 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. See Jones, supra  note 6, at 1375-76 n.122 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313). 
 232. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109-10. 
 233. See supra Part III.A; Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1119. 
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of the Ninth Circuit.  The guidance provided by the Supreme Court makes it 
clear that the Summerlin Court erred in finding that the holding in Ring fits 
within the parameters of this exception. 
The first requirement of the Teague exception is that the new rule must 
enhance the accuracy of the proceeding.234  The Summerlin Court stated that 
the Ring holding enhanced the accuracy of capital sentences because: (1) 
arguments presented to juries are more detailed and formal than those made to 
judges; (2) presentations to judges are more likely to contain inadmissible 
evidence; (3) juries are linked to “contemporary community values”; (4) juries 
are not habituated to the death penalty as judges are; and (5) juries are not 
preoccupied with elections.235  The dissent, on the other hand, counter-argued 
that jury-determined capital sentences are tainted with numerous problems 
such as premature determinations of the defendant’s sentence.236  The dissent 
also rebutted the five arguments of the majority with data from the Capital 
Jury Project and other studies and pointed to portions of the majority’s 
reasoning that are unsupported by empirical data.237 
Due to the majority’s lack of empirical evidence showing the inaccuracy of 
judge-determined death sentences and the dissent’s use of the findings from the 
Capital Jury Project, the dissent’s argument is necessarily more persuasive.  
For instance, the majority provided a survey of Ninth Circuit cases to illustrate 
the informal nature of arguments presented to judges as opposed to those 
presented to juries.238  The survey shows informalities such as failing to 
present mitigating evidence, asking the court for advice on what issues are 
relevant to mitigation, and presenting only brief arguments.239  However, the 
Ninth Circuit provided no support for a finding of a correlation between such 
informalities and inaccuracy in capital sentencing.  On the other hand, the 
dissent used an empirical study of 916 capital jurors to assert that jurors do not 
consider the judge’s instructions in making their sentencing decisions and are 
generally confused about when the death sentence is legally justified.240 
In sum, although the dissent’s argument is more persuasive and better 
supported, Judge Rawlinson is accurate in his observation that “[a]s with most 
 
 234. See supra Part II.B. 
 235. See supra Part III.A. 
 236. See supra Part III.B. 
 237. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1130-31. 
 238. Id. at 1110-11. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1129-30 (explaining that more than 50% of jurors interviewed believed that repeat 
murder, premeditated murder, and multiple murder automatically warranted imposition of the 
death penalty).  The study also indicated that many jurors who formulated an opinion of 
appropriate punishment at the guilt phase of trial and adhered to that opinion during sentencing 
believed that “overwhelming proof of guilt” justified a death sentence.  Id. at 1130. 
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other matters there is another side to the story.”241  The Supreme Court could 
very well agree with the reasoning of either the majority or the dissent.  The 
Court might also choose to rely upon its own empirical data or other reasoning 
to determine that judge-determined sentences are more accurate than jury-
determined sentences, or vice-versa.  Even if the Court agrees with the 
Summerlin majority on this issue of accuracy, such a finding will likely have 
no effect on the retroactivity of Ring, as the Court is unlikely to find that the 
second requirement of the second Teague exception is satisfied. 
In order for the Ring rule to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review via the second Teague exception, it must also be determined by the 
Court to be a “watershed rule,” which alters the understanding of a “bedrock 
procedural element” essential to the fairness of the proceeding.242  The 
Supreme Court has stated that an example of a “watershed rule” is a rule such 
as that of Gideon.243  Based upon this guidance, many courts and scholars have 
understood that the intent of the Supreme Court was for the second Teague 
exception to be applied very narrowly.244  For instance, in their article entitled 
Apres Apprendi, Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein assert that, based upon the 
guidance of the Court, the rule announced in Apprendi did not fall within the 
second exception to Teague.  The authors argue that the Apprendi rule falls 
short of the “primacy” of the rule announced in Gideon, particularly because 
“it does not protect the blameless from punishment” but rather affects only the 
degree of punishment to be imposed.245  Several circuit courts have also 
determined that the rule announced in Apprendi does not fit into this 
exception.246 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly validated Justice 
O’Connor’s prediction that few rules would emerge as bedrock procedural 
elements.  Time after time, the Court has been presented with new rules that 
are argued to be “watershed rules” within the meaning of Teague, and time 
after time the Court has rejected the argument.247  For instance, in 1997 the 
Court considered in O’Dell v. Netherland whether the rule announced in 
Simmons v. South Carolina was “on par” with the rule announced in Gideon 
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and thus within the parameters of the second Teague exception.248  The 
Simmons rule provided that in situations where a capital defendant is ineligible 
for parole and the defendant’s future dangerousness is an issue raised by the 
prosecution, the jury must be instructed of the fact that the defendant is 
ineligible for parole.249  The O’Dell Court determined that the Simmons rule 
did not fit into Teague’s second exception, explaining: 
Unlike the sweeping rule of Gideon, which established an affirmative right to 
counsel in all felony cases, the narrow right of rebuttal that Simmons affords to 
defendants in a limited class of capital cases has hardly ‘altered our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of 
a proceeding.250 
Other rules that have been held not to satisfy the second requirement to the 
second exception are: the requirement that the fair-cross section rule be applied 
to the petit jury;251 the rule prohibiting imposition of the death penalty where 
the jury believes that it is not fully responsible for the sentence;252 and the rule 
permitting a sentencing determination to be based upon the emotions of the 
jury.253 
Based upon the guidance provided by legal scholars, circuit courts, and the 
Supreme Court, the Ring holding would not be logically classified as a 
watershed rule that redefines an understanding of a bedrock procedural 
element.  Like the rule announced in Apprendi, the Ring rule does not, in the 
words of King and Klein, “protect the blameless from punishment.”  It merely 
changes who is to decide the punishment.  Furthermore, like the rule 
announced in Simmons, the Ring rule will impact defendants in a limited class 
of cases, as only capital sentencing schemes in nine states are affected by the 
rule.254  Finally, like the rules announced in Sawyer and Saffle, the Ring rule 
addresses sentencing determinations made by juries.  Because the Supreme 
Court has not yet found such rules to be groundbreaking, it is unlikely to 
happen in this case.  In conclusion, based upon the Supreme Court’s narrow 
interpretation of the second Teague exception, the Court is likely to hold that 
the Ring rule falls considerably short of a watershed rule within the parameters 
of the exception to Teague.  The Ninth Circuit was mistaken to find otherwise. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s two independent and alternative arguments supporting 
retroactive application of the Ring rule deviate from Supreme Court precedent 
establishing the current doctrine of retroactivity.  The arguments also deviate 
from common sense.  The Summerlin Court’s first assertion that Ring 
announced a substantive rule of law that is also partly procedural does nothing 
more than admit that Teague bars its retroactive effect.  Like the holding in 
Apprendi, the holding in Ring mandated that factors increasing a defendant’s 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum, which was life imprisonment in 
Summerlin, must be decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Furthermore, like the holding in Apprendi, the holding in Ring had the effect of 
creating a separate aggravated crime.  The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to 
distinguish the two cases in order to justify its assertion that Ring announced a 
substantive rule of law is unsuccessful.  Finally, the first argument deviates 
from the Supreme Court’s rationale expressed in Bousley. 
The second argument supporting the Summerlin holding — that the Ring 
rule fits within the parameters of the second Teague exception — is equally 
unsupported.  Through its actions and express words, the Supreme Court has 
consistently said that the exception should be applied narrowly.  The Ninth 
Circuit in Summerlin interpreted the exception broadly, and in doing so 
ignored the high standard of the Gideon rule, as well as the intent of the 
Supreme Court. 
In conclusion, a finding that Ring v. Arizona is not retroactive to cases on 
collateral review would have been the only logical way for the Ninth Circuit to 
adhere to Supreme Court precedent.  In holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit 
leaves the Supreme Court no option other than to overturn Summerlin.  In fact, 
if the Court were to agree with the Summerlin decision, it would, in effect, alter 
the doctrine of retroactivity once again and revert to the confusing pre-Teague 
era in which the doctrine was uncertain and Supreme Court decisions, in the 
words of Justice Harlan, were “almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made 
by a beast of prey in search of its intended victim.”255 
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